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Using a therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning as 
its analytical foundation,1 this Article examines the role of testamentary 
formality in the estate planning process.  This analysis demonstrates that 
formal will-execution requirements bolster the overall therapeutic poten-
tial of estate planning,2 or, put differently, it suggests that testamentary 
formality serves a therapeutic function.  This therapeutic function stems 
from the unique relationship between will formalities and the therapeutic 
potential of the estate planning process.  Because legal scholars and law 
reformers have overlooked this connection and therefore have failed to 
recognize testamentary formality’s therapeutic qualities, this Article pro-
vides a fresh perspective of the role of formality in the will-execution 
process and sheds new light on the merits of various reforms of the law 
of wills. 
Therapeutic jurisprudential analysis, which is founded upon “the in-
sight that the law itself can be seen to function as a kind of therapist or 
therapeutic agent,”3 reveals that estate planning has therapeutic and an-
titherapeutic qualities.  These qualities affect the psychological well-
being of those who prepare estate plans and implement those plans 
                                                          
 *   Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional Practice, Louisiana State Univer-
sity, Paul M. Hebert Law Center.  LL.M. 2011, Harvard Law School; J.D. 2008, magna cum laude, 
Boston University School of Law.  Special thanks to Professor Robert Sitkoff, who provided guid-
ance throughout the course of this project. 
 1.  See generally Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 433–61 (2012) (detailing the components of the jurisprudential frame-
work); see also David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353, 355–56 (2004) 
[hereinafter Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence] (describing the origins of therapeutic jurispru-
dence); David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 125, 125 
(2000) [hereinafter Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview] (noting that therapeutic jurispru-
dential issues “have not received very much attention in the law until now”). 
 2.  See infra Part III.A. 
 3.  Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 184, 185 (1997). 
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through the execution of wills and other estate planning documents.4  As 
an integral part of this process,5 will formalities—such as the require-
ments that wills be written, signed by the testator, and attested by at least 
two witnesses6 —frequently interact with and influence the therapeutic 
aspects of estate planning.7  Because of this link between testamentary 
formality and the psychological consequences of preparing for the final 
disposition of one’s property, will formalities have the capacity to either 
promote or diminish the overall therapeutic potential of the estate plan-
ning process. 
Although therapeutic jurisprudence reveals that testamentary formal-
ity can produce both therapeutic and antitherapeutic effects,8 this Article 
argues that will formalities ultimately achieve a net therapeutic outcome.  
The recognition of such a therapeutic function represents the first step of 
a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis, a task that entails the identification 
of the law’s positive and negative psychological consequences.9  The 
completion of this first step provides new insights into the benefits of tes-
tamentary formality.10  It also suggests that losing these benefits is a po-
tential unforeseen cost of two recent developments in the law of wills 
that have diminished the role of formality in the estate planning process 
and that, therefore, threaten to undermine formality’s therapeutic func-
tion. 
First, proponents of reform have pushed for a reduction of testamen-
tary formality, which would eliminate or replace some of the traditional 
formal requirements of will execution.11  Second, the law reform move-
ment has argued for the relaxation of the formalism that has long re-
quired strict literal compliance with the prescribed formalities.  This re-
form would allow probate courts to validate some wills despite 
noncompliance with the prescribed formalities.12  The second step of 
                                                          
 4.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 433–61. 
 5.  See Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: 
An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 160 (2008). 
 6.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 226 (8th ed. 2009) (explaining that “these basic requirements for execution of wills vary 
considerably in detail from state to state.”). 
 7.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 465–67 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of the re-
duced formal requirements of military wills). 
 8.  See id. at 433–65. 
 9.  See Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
 10.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 443–61 (illustrating this first step in the context of estate plan-
ning). 
 11.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify ways to maximize the law’s ther-
apeutic aspects and minimize its negative psychological consequences.13  
As such, a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of will formalities requires 
an examination of these proposed reforms to determine which would 
maximize the law’s overall therapeutic potential.  Using this therapeutic 
jurisprudential framework, this Article reexamines the law reform devel-
opments that threaten testamentary formality’s therapeutic potential and 
argues that therapeutic considerations should be included in the debate 
regarding the proper role of testamentary formality. 
Ultimately, the application of therapeutic jurisprudence to the study 
of testamentary formality affirms calls for certain reforms of the law of 
wills, such as the reduction of ancillary testamentary formality14 and the 
authorization of notarized wills.15  The analysis also raises doubts regard-
ing the merits of another proposed reform, namely the elimination of the 
attestation requirement.16  Perhaps most importantly, however, therapeu-
tic jurisprudence reasserts the need to relax the formalism that mandates 
strict literal compliance with the formalities of will execution.17  Despite 
widespread support within the legal academy, change in this area has 
been slow moving.18  In hopes of spurring progress in this reform effort, 
this Article’s therapeutic jurisprudential analysis uniquely demonstrates 
the harshness of the rule of strict compliance and further bolsters the ar-
guments in favor of reform.19 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II provides an overview of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and introduces the therapeutic jurisprudential 
framework of estate planning.  Part III presents the first step of therapeu-
tic jurisprudential analysis and identifies the therapeutic function of tes-
tamentary formality.  Finally, by analyzing the implications of testamen-
tary formality’s therapeutic function, Part IV undertakes the second step 
of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis and argues that formality’s ther-
                                                          
 13.  See Jason Schultz, Can Women Judges Help Make Civil Sexual Assault Trials More Thera-
peutic?, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 54 (2001); Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview, supra 
note 1, at 125. 
 14.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 16.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 17.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 18.  See Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evi-
dence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 601–602 
(2007) (explaining that only eight states have implemented a harmless error rule in the U.S., and of 
those states, only a few have applied the rule). 
 19.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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apeutic benefits should be included in the discussion regarding testamen-
tary formality’s proper role in the estate planning process. 
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 
Over the past twenty years,20 therapeutic jurisprudence has emerged 
as an analytical tool that provides fresh perspectives of the formerly ig-
nored psychological and emotional consequences of the law.21  As Pro-
fessor David Wexler, a prominent scholar in the field, explains, therapeu-
tic jurisprudence “focuses on the law’s impact on emotional life and on 
psychological well-being,” and “focuses our attention on this previously 
underappreciated aspect, humanizing the law and concerning itself with 
the human, emotional, [and] psychological side[s] of law and the legal 
process.”22  Legal scholars developed therapeutic jurisprudence within 
the field of mental health law,23 and, since its emergence, therapeutic ju-
risprudential analysis has spread to numerous other areas.24  Indeed, pro-
ponents continue to broaden the scope of therapeutic jurisprudence and 
argue for its expansion to all areas of law.25 
A. Therapeutic Jurisprudential Analysis 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis consists of two steps.  First, 
therapeutic jurisprudence entails identifying the positive and negative 
                                                          
 20.  See Marilyn McMahon & David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Developments and 
Applications in Australia and New Zealand, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1 (Marilyn 
McMahon & David Wexler eds., 2003); Winick, supra note 3, at 184. 
 21.  Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 356 (“The law’s influence on emo-
tional life and psychological well-being has traditionally been ignored by the law or regarded as 
something apart from the law and its concern.  But therapeutic jurisprudence as an academic disci-
pline started focusing on different kinds of legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes.”). 
 22.  Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview, supra note 1, at 125; see also Winick, supra 
note 3, at 185 (“Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic 
agent.”). 
 23.  McMahon & Wexler, supra note 20, at 1. 
 24.  See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) (explaining that therapeutic jurisprudence has “spread into 
many other areas,” such as “sentencing and probation agreements, workers’ compensation law, sex-
ual orientation law, disability law, fault-based tort compensation schemes, domestic violence, crime 
victims, mandatory child abuse reporting, contract law, and family law” (footnotes omitted)). 
 25.  See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Rediscovering Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Overlooked Areas of 
the Law—How Exposing Its Presence in the Environmental Justice Movement Can Legitimize the 
Paradigm and Make the Case for Its Inclusion into All Aspects of Legal Education and the Practice 
of Law, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 215, 218 (2008). 
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psychological consequences of a particular aspect of the law.26  These 
positive and negative psychological consequences are labeled therapeutic 
and antitherapeutic.27  Second, the framework developed in the first step 
of the analysis is used to identify ways that the law can be shaped to 
maximize its overall therapeutic potential.28  The analysis achieves this 
goal by analyzing how potential reforms would either bolster the law’s 
positive psychological qualities or diminish its antitherapeutic conse-
quences.29  In this regard, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to maximize 
the therapeutic potential of not only substantive laws, but also procedural 
rules and the roles of those who participate in the legal process.30 
Although a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis seeks to maximize 
the law’s overall therapeutic potential, therapeutic jurisprudence does not 
demand that the most therapeutic outcome prevail.31  Therapeutic juris-
prudence merely suggests that therapeutic issues should be evaluated 
alongside other policy considerations.32  As Wexler explains, “therapeu-
tic jurisprudence does not itself suggest that therapeutic goals should 
trump other ones . . . .  It is simply a way of looking at the law in a richer 
way, and then bringing to the table some of these areas and issues that 
previously have gone unnoticed.”33  In sum, therapeutic jurisprudence 
encourages the inclusion of therapeutic considerations in the cost–benefit 
analysis of the law and proposes that, all else being equal, the law should 
be shaped to maximize its therapeutic potential. 
B. The Therapeutic Jurisprudence of Estate Planning 
The estate planning and probate processes are emotionally charged 
and raise a number of psychological issues.34  Therapeutic jurisprudence 
                                                          
 26.  See Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See Schultz, supra note 13, at 54. 
 29.  Winick, supra note 3, at 185. 
 30.  See Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview, supra note 1, at 126. 
 31.  See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSY-
CHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 211–12 (1995) (“[T]he goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to pinpoint 
the therapeutic impact of legal rules, not to require that therapeutic values trump other values.”);  
see, e.g., David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of 
Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 759, 762 (1993). 
 32.  See Schultz, supra note 13, at 54 (listing other factors that could be considered alongside 
therapeutic considerations, such as “constitutionality, individual autonomy, integrity of the fact-
finding process, and community safety.”). 
 33.  Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Overview, supra note 1, at 125. 
 34.  See Patricia Monroe Wisnom, Note, Probate Law and Mediation: A Therapeutic Perspec-
tive, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1995). 
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is therefore an especially insightful analytical tool with respect to the law 
of succession.35  Despite the intuitive connection between therapeutic ju-
risprudence and the law of succession, legal scholars generally have 
failed to broadly apply the therapeutic jurisprudential framework in the 
estate planning and probate contexts.36  Recognizing this analytical op-
portunity, recent scholarship urges the widespread application of thera-
peutic jurisprudence to the law of succession.37  Specifically, by examin-
ing the therapeutic and antitherapeutic qualities of estate planning, such 
scholarship develops a therapeutic jurisprudential framework of the es-
tate planning process, which can be used to evaluate the therapeutic con-
sequences of a broad array of estate planning issues.38 
Because wills—and therefore will formalities—are inherent aspects 
of the estate planning process,39 the therapeutic jurisprudential analysis 
of testamentary formality must take place within the larger framework of 
estate planning.  When examined within this context, therapeutic juris-
prudence reveals that will formalities interact with the therapeutic quali-
ties of estate planning and affect the overall therapeutic potential of the 
estate planning process.  However, before undertaking the analysis of 
how formal will-execution requirements influence the therapeutic aspects 
of the estate planning process, the larger therapeutic jurisprudential 
framework of estate planning must be established.40 
1. Antitherapeutic Aspects of Estate Planning 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of estate planning reveals that 
certain aspects of the estate planning process can negatively affect the 
testator’s psychological well-being.  The first and perhaps most obvious 
of these antitherapeutic qualities is the death anxiety that the testator can 
experience as a result of acknowledging her own mortality.41  When pre-
paring and implementing an estate plan, the testator must necessarily 
                                                          
 35.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 432–33. 
 36.  See id.  Some examples of the application of therapeutic jurisprudence to the law of succes-
sion do exist.  See, e.g., Pamela R. Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 560–62 
(2002–2003) (providing a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of testamentary capacity); Dara 
Greene, Note & Comment, Antemortem Probate: A Mediation Model, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RE-
SOL. 663, 679–80 (1999) (exploring the therapeutic ramifications of mediation); Wisnom, supra note 
34, at 1354 (analyzing the role of the personal representative within the probate process). 
 37.  See generally Glover, supra note 1. 
 38.  Id. at 467–70. 
 39.  See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 40.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 433–61. 
 41.  Id. at 434–38. 
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confront the possibility of death.42  Indeed, the sole purpose of estate 
planning is to prepare for death, and because acknowledging one’s mor-
tality is typically unpleasant and potentially severely disturbing,43 the es-
tate planning process can produce death anxiety and other negative psy-
chological effects.44  These antitherapeutic consequences may dissuade 
the testator from completing her estate plan and may impair the testator’s 
decision-making capabilities.45 
A second antitherapeutic aspect of the estate planning process is the 
possibility of an estate dispute,46 as those who prepare estate plans often 
worry that their families will argue over their wealth once they are 
gone.47  The primary reason that the potential for estate disputes can 
cause anxiety for those preparing estate plans is that estate litigation gen-
erally produces familial conflict.48  This intrafamily conflict can devas-
tate familial bonds, sometimes irreparably damaging previously amicable 
families.49  Familial conflict is not the only consequence of an estate dis-
pute that may worry testators.  For example, probate litigation frequently 
delves into intensely personal issues, such as the testator’s mental capaci-
ty, complicated family dynamics, and economic and financial matters.50  
Such information can be embarrassing when displayed in a public forum 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 434. 
 43.  See Charles I. Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at 
the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 348 (1979) (explaining that “facing the reality of death 
and its attendant consequences is one of the most difficult responsibilities in life.”); Thomas L. Shaf-
fer, The “Estate Planning” Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IOWA L. REV. 376, 377 
(1969) (“[D]eath is an unpleasant fact to modern man.”). 
 44.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 434–35. 
 45.  See id. at 435–38 (discussing the extent to which people with death anxiety avoid activities 
that require considerations of death). 
 46.  Id. at 438–41. 
 47.  See Jennifer Harper, Splitting Heirs Over Wealth: But Children Usually Inherit Most of It, 
WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A1 (reporting that 18% of affluent Americans fear that their fami-
lies will fight over their estates). 
 48.  See Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Dis-
putes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 397 (1997) (“Persons 
planning the transfer of property after death . . . view family harmony as a tangential, but important 
goal.”); Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute 
Resolution in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 637–
38 (2000) (“Many, if not most, cases arising in probate, trust, and guardianship involve families 
whose relationships could be irreparably shattered by bitter and prolonged litigation.”). 
 49.  See Gary, supra note 48, at 397; Radford, supra note 48, at 637–38; Yolanda Vorys, Note, 
The Best of Both Worlds: The Use of Med-Arb for Resolving Will Disputes, 22 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RE-
SOL. 871, 874–75 (2007). 
 50.  See Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928) (“Contests over the allowance of 
wills frequently, if not invariably, result in minute examination into the habits, manners, beliefs, 
conduct, idiosyncrasies, and all the essentially private and personal affairs of the testator . . . .”). 
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and can exacerbate preexisting familial tension.51  Because the testator 
may fear public airing of her family’s “dirty laundry,”52 the potential for 
estate disputes is one antitherapeutic consequence of the estate planning 
process. 
The final antitherapeutic aspect of estate planning is the testator’s 
fear of probate.53  Probate is the process by which the testator’s debts are 
paid and property is distributed to the estate beneficiaries.54  Those who 
prepare estate plans often fear this process for several reasons.  First, 
probate can be costly.55  Numerous expenses arise during the probate 
process, such as attorney’s fees and court costs,56 and testators often fear 
that such costs will substantially deplete their estates.57  Second, the pro-
bate process can be protracted.58  Probate is judicially supervised, which 
can slow the administration of the decedent’s estate.59  Consequently, 
testators sometimes fear probate because they do not want their friends 
and family members to deal with the stress of the probate process during 
a time when they are still grieving the loss of a loved one.60  Finally, tes-
tators sometimes fear probate because the process can be intrusive.61  As 
discussed previously, if an estate dispute arises, deeply private and po-
                                                          
 51.  See Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final 
Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 636 (1994) (explaining that “the publicity surrounding a will contest” 
is characterized by “ridicule, contempt, and criticism”); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving 
More Than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
539, 567 (2008) (“A testator whose dispositions depart from social norms may fear a contest because 
the trial will expose his or her personal life, and that of his family, to public humiliation or ridi-
cule.”). 
 52.  See Begleiter, supra note 51, at 636–39 (describing the scrutiny under which a testator’s 
life is examined during a will contest under the heading of “Family Antagonism and the Airing of 
Dirty Linen in Public”); Love & Sterk, supra note 51, at 567 (explaining that “[a] testator . . . may 
fear a [will] contest because . . . [of] the prospect that the family’s dirty laundry will be aired in pub-
lic.”). 
 53.  Glover, supra note 1, at 441–43. 
 54.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 39. 
 55.  See John H. Martin, Reconfiguring Estate Settlement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 42, 50 (2009). 
 56.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 45 (“Much is heard about the excessive cost of 
probate—or, as some have put it, the high cost of dying.”). 
 57.  See Martin, supra note 55, at 50. 
 58.  See id. at 48. 
 59.  See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS 
AND ESTATES 630 (4th ed. 2010) (“[A]dministration of an estate typically lasts for many months or 
even years.”). 
 60.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 442 (“[T]estators realize that their families will be coping with 
their deaths during the probate process . . . .”). 
 61.  See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 722 (2006) (“Once a will is filed for probate, it becomes public record for all 
the world to see.”). 
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tentially embarrassing issues may be publicly examined, which can pro-
duce anxiety in those who undertake the estate planning process.62  The 
antitherapeutic aspects of the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of 
estate planning therefore include the testator’s fear of probate, the possi-
bility of estate disputes and familial conflict, and the testator’s confronta-
tion with death. 
2. Therapeutic Aspects of Estate Planning 
In addition to these antitherapeutic aspects, the therapeutic jurispru-
dential framework of estate planning has a number of therapeutic com-
ponents that positively affect the psychological well-being of the testa-
tor.63  For example, the testator can experience positive psychological 
consequences from the broad liberty to craft an estate plan that best 
meets her preferences.64  Although state legislatures attempt to enact in-
testacy statutes that fulfill the average testator’s expectations,65 many 
people have unique testamentary preferences that diverge from the de-
fault distributional scheme of intestacy.66  Because testators are free to 
prepare estate plans that best fulfill their testamentary preferences, those 
whose preferred estate plans differ from the default scheme of intestacy 
can derive comfort and satisfaction from freedom of testation.67 
In addition to testamentary freedom, the role of the estate planning 
attorney is another therapeutic aspect of the estate planning process.68  
Typically, a lawyer assists the testator with preparing and implementing 
an estate plan.69  Along with providing legal advice regarding the tech-
nical aspects of estate planning, the lawyer can also serve as a therapeu-
tic agent for her client by helping the testator prepare for and cope with 
the antitherapeutic aspects of the estate planning process.70  For example, 
the estate planning attorney can undertake strategies to minimize the pos-
                                                          
 62.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 443. 
 63.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 443–61. 
 64.  Id. at 444–46. 
 65.  See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. 
REV. 1705, 1766 (1992). 
 66.  Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 652 (1992). 
 67.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 445 (stating that autonomous choice improves testators’ psy-
chological well-being). 
 68.  See id. at 446–50. 
 69.  See Daphna Hacker, Soulless Wills, 35 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 957, 979–80 (2010) 
(“[L]awyers dominate the will-production market, and most testators turn to them for advice in draft-
ing their wills . . . .”). 
 70.  Glover, supra note 1, at 448–50. 
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sibility of estate disputes, provide realistic estimates of the cost and delay 
of probate, and diminish the testator’s death anxiety by preparing an es-
tate plan that fulfills her needs and quells some of her testamentary con-
cerns.71 
The ritualistic nature of the will-execution ceremony also can posi-
tively affect the psychological well-being of those who prepare and im-
plement estate plans.72  For instance, the exercise of testamentary power 
is an important event for many people; therefore, because the ceremony 
symbolizes the significance of the testamentary experience, the testator 
can derive satisfaction from the ritualistic nature of the will-execution 
process.73  Additionally, while preparing an estate plan, the testator can 
experience anxiety because she must acknowledge the inevitability of her 
own death.74  However, by serving as a framework through which the 
testator can cope with her confrontation with mortality, the will-
execution ceremony can diminish some of the negative psychological 
consequences of the testator’s death anxiety.75 
Finally, estate planning can prove therapeutic for the testator because 
the process can be a tool for self-expression.76  Either through the lan-
guage of an estate planning document or by the act of providing for 
friends and family in an estate plan,77 the estate planning process can be 
an important self-expressive outlet for the testator.  Testamentary self-
expression can produce a variety of positive psychological consequences.  
For example, the testator can express love and affection for friends and 
family,78 which is therapeutic for the testator because she can draw 
pleasure from making those she loves happy.79  Additionally, by benefit-
                                                          
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. at 450–55. 
 73.  See Estate Planning for Human Beings, 3 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 69.1902 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter Estate Planning] (statement of Dean Willard H. Pedrick, panelist) (“The estate planning pro-
cess . . . ought to be a high ceremonial occasion because a client should be getting great intangible 
satisfactions about the[] significant decisions that he has made [and] that were embodied in the in-
struments [that] he leaves behind.”); see also John A. Warnick, The Ungrateful Living: An Estate 
Planner’s Nightmare—The Trial Attorney’s Dream, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 401, 422–23 (1989) 
(explaining that the ceremonial aspect of will execution “may be important in fulfilling the client’s 
unexpressed expectations.”). 
 74.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 75.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 454–55. 
 76.  Id. at 455. 
 77.  Id. at 455–56. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests For Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
33, 52–53 (1999) (“When a testator bequeaths to persons, the satisfaction she derives from the trans-
fer . . . stems from what the economists, in their inimitable fashion, dub an interdependent utility 
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ing certain organizations or causes in her estate plan, the testator can 
mold her posthumous reputation.80  Shaping one’s public perception can 
be psychologically satisfying, and using one’s estate plan to achieve 
one’s desired posthumous reputation is therefore one therapeutic aspect 
of the estate planning process.81  In sum, the testator’s opportunity for 
self-expression stands alongside freedom of testation, the role of the es-
tate planning lawyer, and the will-execution ceremony as a therapeutic 
aspect of the estate planning process. 
III. THE THERAPEUTIC FUNCTION OF TESTAMENTARY FORMALITY 
Just as all testators must confront death during the estate planning 
process, those who prepare and implement estate plans typically employ 
wills as part of the process and therefore must comply with an assortment 
of formal will-execution requirements.82  Generally, these formalities re-
quire that a will be written, signed, and attested by at least two witnesses; 
however, some jurisdictions require other formalities as well.83  The pri-
mary purpose of these formalities is to ensure that the will accurately and 
reliably reflects the testator’s true testamentary intent.84  Testamentary 
formality, however, may also serve other purposes.85 
Because testamentary formality is a fundamental component of the 
estate planning process, the application of therapeutic jurisprudence to 
                                                                                                                                  
 
function: Making her loved ones happy also makes the testator happy.”). 
 80.  See id. at 53–54 (“An estate plan can serve as the final move in this social game, communi-
cating to survivors how individuals prefer to be remembered.”). 
 81.  Glover, supra note 1, at 456–58. 
 82.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 226–27. 
 83.  Id. at 226. 
 84.  See In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991) (“The primary purpose of [will] 
formalities is to ensure that the document reflects the uncoerced intent of the testator.”).  Legal 
scholars have identified four functions that will formalities serve in furtherance of formality’s ulti-
mate goal of fulfilling testamentary intent.  First, by requiring the testator to leave behind a written, 
signed, and attested document that provides reliable evidence of testamentary intent, will formalities 
serve an evidentiary function.  Second, the formal requirements of valid will execution serve a pro-
tective function by protecting the testator from fraud and undue influence.  Third, the cautionary 
function of testamentary formality impresses upon the testator the importance of will execution and 
encourages careful planning and adequate deliberation.  Finally, will formalities standardize the form 
of most wills, thus easing the administrative burden of probate courts.  This fourth function of testa-
mentary formality is called the channeling function.  John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with 
the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491–98 (1975). 
 85.  See PETER M. TIERSMA, PARCHMENT, PAPER, PIXELS: LAW AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF 
COMMUNICATION 60–62 (2010) (identifying the textualizing function); Mark Glover, Formal Execu-
tion and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 411, 431–40 (2009) (identifying the family protection function). 
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the study of will formalities requires an analysis of how such formalities 
interact with and influence the therapeutic and antitherapeutic aspects of 
estate planning.  Using this therapeutic jurisprudential framework, this 
section analyzes the role of will formalities in the estate planning pro-
cess, including how they either bolster or diminish the therapeutic and 
antitherapeutic qualities of estate planning.  Based on this analysis, this 
section argues that one additional purpose of testamentary formality is to 
promote the therapeutic aspects of estate planning.  Indeed, because for-
mal will-execution requirements enhance the overall therapeutic poten-
tial of the estate planning process, testamentary formality serves a thera-
peutic function. 
A. Therapeutic Aspects of Testamentary Formality 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals that testamentary for-
mality has therapeutic qualities.  Such an analysis suggests that the ther-
apeutic aspects of testamentary formality are those qualities of will for-
malities that either enhance the therapeutic aspects of estate planning or 
diminish the process’s negative psychological consequences.  When ex-
amined within this framework, testamentary formality can be seen as 
bolstering several of the positive psychological aspects of the estate 
planning process, including the doctrine of testamentary freedom, the 
counsel of an estate planning attorney, and the ritualistic nature of the 
will-execution ceremony.  Testamentary formality therefore serves a 
therapeutic function because it promotes the overall therapeutic potential 
of estate planning. 
1. Testamentary Safe Harbor 
Freedom of testation can be a source of great psychological benefit 
because the testator can draft a will and dispose of her estate as she 
chooses.86  This psychological benefit is possible only if the testator has 
some expectation that her testamentary preferences will be fulfilled.  
Without a guarantee that the testator’s wishes will be respected, testa-
mentary freedom’s therapeutic potential is diminished.  Specifically, if 
the law provided no guidance regarding valid will execution, the testator 
would bear the responsibility of successfully expressing the legal signifi-
cance of her action to the probate court.87  The testator would then have 
                                                          
 86.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 87.  See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 802 (1941) (explain-
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no assurance that the court would recognize her words as a valid exercise 
of testamentary power, thus weakening the therapeutic consequences of 
testamentary freedom. 
Will formalities address this potential uncertainty of testamentary 
freedom by providing a safe harbor through which the testator can effec-
tively communicate testamentary intent.88  Legal formalities generally 
create a safe harbor in which to perform acts of legal significance be-
cause they provide “channels for the legally effective expression of in-
tention.”89  Put differently, “form[ality] offers a legal framework into 
which the party,” who desires to perform an act of legal significance, 
such as entering into a contract or executing a will, “may fit his ac-
tions . . . .”90  By requiring the testator to express her testamentary intent 
in the prescribed form of a written, signed, and attested document, the 
law of wills reduces the uncertainty of valid will execution and provides 
a method of exercising testamentary power that a probate court will rec-
ognize as legally valid.91 
Satisfying the requirements of the safe harbor is not conclusive evi-
dence of testamentary intent, as a contestant can still argue that the dece-
dent did not intend to execute a will.92  However, the safe harbor makes 
the contestant’s task difficult because compliance with the prescribed 
formalities triggers a presumption of testamentary intent that the contest-
ant must overcome.93  Testamentary formality therefore contributes to 
                                                                                                                                  
 
ing that “[o]ne planning to enter a legal transaction faces a . . . problem” because “[h]is mind first 
conceives an economic or sentimental objective” and “[h]e must then . . . cast about for the legal 
transaction . . . which will most nearly accomplish these objectives.”); John H. Langbein, Excusing 
Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate 
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (“Without prescribed formalities, the testator would be left to 
grope for his own means of persuading the probate court that his intentions were final and volition-
al.”); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1992) (“In a system 
without the safe harbor of a will, a testator might have to go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that 
her wishes were followed after her death.”). 
 88.  Langbein, supra note 87, at 4; Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1031. 
 89.  Fuller, supra note 87, at 801. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 494 (explaining that because of will formalities the testator 
“does not have to devise for himself a mode of communicating his testamentary wishes to the court, 
and to worry whether it will be effective.”); Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1031 (“One of the positive 
effects of formalism is that known acts produce known results.  Formalities bring consistency and 
protection against arbitrariness.”). 
 92.  See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of 
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 541–42 (1982) (discuss-
ing “the so-called ‘sham will’ cases”). 
 93.  Id. 
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the therapeutic potential of testamentary freedom by creating this safe 
harbor for the exercise of testamentary power, which raises a presump-
tion of testamentary intent and provides the testator the peace of mind of 
knowing that her testamentary preferences will be respected.94 
2. Incentive to Seek Legal Assistance 
In addition to freedom of testation, the counsel of a lawyer during the 
preparation of a testamentary scheme and the execution of a will can 
have therapeutic consequences for the testator.  Although the estate plan-
ning attorney can serve as a therapeutic agent for her client, the law does 
not require that the testator consult a lawyer.  The formal requirements of 
valid will execution, however, foster the therapeutic potential of estate 
planning by encouraging the testator to seek legal assistance during the 
will-execution process.95  Certainly, the testator may engage a lawyer for 
many reasons.96  For example, the client may seek legal advice to mini-
mize estate taxes or reduce the risk of a will contest.97  But, in addition to 
the variety of other concerns that encourage the testator to seek legal ad-
vice, the formality of will execution incentivizes the consultation of an 
estate planning attorney.98 
Will formalities encourage the testator to consult a lawyer in two 
ways.  First, because the testator must comply with a variety of technical 
requirements, the will-execution process is “a fertile field for error.”99  
As a result, the testator may seek the aid of a lawyer to guide her through 
the process of complying with the prescribed formalities.100  Second, will 
                                                          
 94.  See Langbein, supra note 87, at 4 (“The greatest blessing of the Wills Act formalities is the 
safe harbor that they create” because “[t]he testator who complies with [them] assures his estate of 
routine probate in all but exceptional circumstances.”).  But see infra Part II.B. 
 95.  See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succes-
sion, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 368 (1966); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsisten-
cy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1066–67 n.31 (1996) (“[T]he intervention of attorneys” in the will-
execution process, “though not mandatory, is encouraged simply by the requirement that testators 
fulfill the technical formalities.”); Langbein, supra note 84, at 494 n.26 (stating that the Wills Act 
forms encourage the use of lawyers). 
 96.  See Love & Sterk, supra note 51, at 551–54. 
 97.  Id. at 552. 
 98.  See Friedman, supra note 95, at 368. 
 99.  Gerry W. Beyer, Avoiding the Estate Planning “Blue Screen of Death”—Common Non-
Tax Errors and How to Prevent Them, 1 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 61, 93 (2008). 
 100.  Hirsch, supra note 95, at 1066–67 n.31; see also William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform 
Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1081 (1966) (“Contracts affecting succes-
sion . . . are likely to cause much suffering if entered into without competent advice as to their ef-
fects.  Consequently, it seems desirable to impose [formal] requirements upon the making of such 
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formalities encourage the use of an estate planning attorney by impress-
ing upon the testator the importance and legal significance of preparing 
an estate plan and executing a will.101  Without formal requirements, the 
testator may not fully consider the significance of executing a will and 
therefore may minimize the prudence of having legal assistance during 
the will-execution process.  Because will formalities provide the will-
execution process a level of technical complexity and encourage the tes-
tator to fully consider the legal significance of her actions, the testator 
more likely recognizes the need for legal guidance during the will-
execution process,102 and, as a result, the estate planning attorney has a 
greater opportunity to be a therapeutic agent for the testator. 
3. Elements of the Will-Execution Ceremony 
The ceremonial, or ritualistic, nature of the will-execution process 
positively affects the testator’s psychological well-being in a variety of 
ways.103  This ritualistic nature of the will-execution process results from 
the statutorily prescribed will formalities.  Indeed, the formal require-
ments of valid will execution—which mandate that a will be written, 
signed by the testator, and attested by at least two witnesses104—are the 
foundation of the will-execution ceremony. 
Although the term may be ascribed a variety of meanings, “[r]itual 
can be defined as the performance of a more or less invariant sequence 
of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performer.”105  
With this definition in mind, formalism stands out as a primary ritualistic 
component because ritual uses “a structured set of words and bodily ges-
tures,” that are “invariant” and “governed by complex codes of orches-
tration . . . .”106  The execution of a will undoubtedly possesses this ritu-
                                                                                                                                  
 
contracts that are so difficult that they cannot be met without the advice of counsel.”). 
 101.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 495 (“One purpose of many of the forms is to impress the 
testator with the seriousness of the testament . . . .”). 
 102.  See Friedman, supra note 95, at 367–68 (“The formalities of executing a will are useful 
ones” because “[t]hey impress the testator with the solemnity of his acts; they ensure a standard writ-
ten document, . . . they eliminate most of the dangers of forgery and fraud; [and] they encourage the 
use of middlemen (lawyers) who can help plan a rational, trouble-free disposition of assets.”). 
 103.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 104.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 226. 
 105.  Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice Into Law: Ritual and Social Norms Juris-
prudence, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389, 408–09 (2003). 
 106.  See id. at 409 (“[T]he ritual process is highly conventionalized, and employs a ‘restricted 
code’ of communication” that is “characterized by: (1) a limited means of expression; (2) a corre-
spondingly limited ability to convey information; and (3) a resulting sharp limitation on the freedom 
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alistic characteristic.107  The formalism of testation closely mirrors typi-
cal ritualistic formalism because the law of wills prescribes the process 
by which a testator must execute a will, and the testator must precisely 
follow these mandated rules.  Put differently, the statutes governing will 
execution serve as the “complex codes of orchestration”108 that the testa-
tor must invariably follow.109 
A second general characteristic of ritual is the use of symbolism110 
and “notions of the sacred”111 to set the ritual apart from everyday life.  
Again, will formalities provide the will-execution process this ritualistic 
trait because the requirement of a written, signed, and attested document 
sets the process apart from the commonplace tasks of life.  Formalities 
symbolize the importance of the testator’s actions and provide the pro-
cess a general aura of solemnity.112  For example, the requirement that a 
will be written signifies the importance of the testamentary act by elimi-
nating the possibility of oral testamentary dispositions.113  Because 
“[w]riting has always been regarded as the most solemn form of expres-
sion,”114 the testator more likely recognizes the importance and legal sig-
nificance of creating a will, which, in turn, contributes to the ritualistic 
                                                                                                                                  
 
of receivers of ritual communication to interpret the meaning of this communication in more than 
one way.”); Steven Hartwell, Humor, Anger, Rules, and Rituals, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 370–71 
n.102 (2006). 
 107.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 489 (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and relent-
less formalism.”); Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1010 (“Formalism may be falling, but it isn’t dead.”). 
 108.  Cappel, supra note 105, at 409. 
 109.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 489 (explaining that “[t]he Wills Act prescribes a particular 
set of formalities for executing one’s testament” and that “once a formal defect is found, Anglo-
American courts have been unanimous in concluding that the attempted will fails.”). 
 110.  Cappel, supra note 105, at 410; Hartwell, supra note 106, at 370. 
 111.  Hartwell, supra note 106, at 370–71 n.102 (explaining that “rituals appear to take place in 
time and place apart from everyday activity”); see Cappel, supra note 105, at 410 (“[S]acrality . . . 
distinguish[es] ritualized from non-ritualized (everyday) activity.”). 
 112.  See Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guid-
ance from the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1907 (1996); Ben Kusmin, Note & Comment, Swing 
Low, Sweet Chariot: Abandoning the Disinterested Witness Requirement for Advance Directives, 32 
AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 99 (2006) (explaining that the execution of a will “has pomp and circumstance” 
that routine activities do not). 
 113.  See Fuller, supra note 87, at 800 (explaining that the requirement of a writing “induc[es] 
[a] circumspective frame of mind.”); Langbein, supra note 84, at 495 (“The requirements of writing 
and signature are . . . the primary cautionary formalities.  Writing is somewhat less casual than plain 
chatter.  As we say in a common figure of speech, ‘talk is cheap.’”). 
 114.  Nelson & Starck, supra note 43, at 349; see Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, 
Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1941) (“[T]here is certain ritual value in 
writing out [a] document . . . .”); Langbein, supra note 84, at 519 (“Although some modes of elec-
tronic communication can perform some of the functions of writing . . . they lack the solemnity and 
finality of a signed document.”). 
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character of the will-execution process. 
The signature requirement also contributes to the symbolism and so-
lemnity of the will-execution process.  Like the writing requirement, the 
signature requirement represents the finality of the testator’s actions and 
is meant to impress upon the testator the legal significance of preparing a 
will.115  Traditionally, people use their signatures as symbols of the final-
ity of their actions, particularly when completing documents of legal im-
port.116  As such, during the will-execution process, the testator likely 
recognizes the symbolism and legal significance of her signature.117  The 
testator’s placement of her signature upon the will is therefore a symbol-
ic act that serves as one element of the will-execution ceremony. 
Finally, the attestation requirement, perhaps more so than the other 
formalities, distinguishes the exercise of testamentary power from daily 
routine.118  As Professor Lon Fuller explains in his classic article examin-
ing legal formalities, the requirements of attestation serve the same pur-
pose as the formal requirement of the seal, which was a “symbol in the 
popular mind of legalism and weightiness” and “was an excellent device 
for inducing [a] circumspective frame of mind.”119  Attestation achieves 
this symbolic quality largely by introducing outsiders into the will-
                                                          
 115.  See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 114, at 5 (explaining that “[t]he signature tends to show 
that the instrument was finally adopted by the testator as his will”); Langbein, supra note 87, at 3 
(“Signature . . . caution[s] the testator about the seriousness and finality of his act.”); see also Chad 
Michael Ross, Comment, Probate—Taylor v. Holt: The Tennessee Court of Appeals Allows a Com-
puter Generated Signature to Validate a Testamentary Will, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 603, 608 (2005) 
(explaining that the testator’s signature symbolizes the finality of the testator’s actions).  The sub-
scription formality, which requires the testator to sign at the end of her will, can also add to the ritu-
alistic character of the will-execution process.  See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 114, at 5–6. 
 116.  One commentator has argued that the “growing use of signature in routine petty transac-
tions has reduced” the significance of the signature requirement.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 518.  
“However, it could be argued that the routine use of signature as an implementing act in ordinary 
business transactions may enhance its ‘ritual’ impact, because the omission of a signature from a 
document produces an inference of a lack of finality of intention.”  C. Douglas Miller, Will Formali-
ty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code 
“Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, 
the Rite of Testation, and the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 
167, 265 (1991). 
 117.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 518 (“Most people would not lightly sign anything captioned 
‘Last Will and Testament.’”). 
 118.  See Miller, supra note 116, at 260–61 (explaining that attestation contributes most to the 
will-execution ritual “because it induces the testator to select witnesses to the testament and other-
wise to engage in deliberate, premeditated conduct . . . .”); see also Langbein, supra note 84, at 495 
(“The formalities associated with attestation” transform “[t]he execution of the will . . . into a cere-
mony impressing the participants with its solemnity and legal significance.”). 
 119.  Fuller, supra note 87, at 800. 
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execution process.120  Indeed, the inclusion of witnesses in the testamen-
tary experience greatly enhances the ritualistic nature of will execu-
tion.121  The formality of attestation together with the signature and writ-
ing requirements therefore serve as the elements of the will-execution 
ceremony and distinguish the creation of a will from other mundane and 
trivial activities. 
In addition to serving as the foundation of the testamentary ritual, 
formalities also provide the will-execution process a ceremonial charac-
ter by encouraging the testator to seek legal assistance.122  The estate 
planning lawyer in turn reinforces the ritualistic qualities of the will-
execution process in two ways.  First, the testator’s lawyer inevitably 
stresses the importance of compliance with the prescribed formalities123 
and therefore perpetuates the invariant formalism that is a primary char-
acteristic of ritual.124  Second, the testator’s lawyer contributes to the 
symbolism and formality of the will-execution ceremony, thereby setting 
the execution of a will further apart from the inconsequential tasks of 
daily life.  For example, the mere presence of the lawyer during will exe-
cution adds a degree of formality to the ceremony, and the execution of a 
will is further distinguished from the testator’s normal routine when the 
ceremony takes place in the lawyer’s office rather than a more informal 
setting, such as the testator’s home.125  Finally, the estate planning attor-
ney may insist that the testator comply with nonmandatory formalities, 
such as notarization, which provides the will-execution ceremony even 
greater formality.126 
In sum, the formal requirements of valid will execution serve as the 
                                                          
 120.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 521. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 123.  Even in jurisdictions that authorize holographic wills, which require a reduced level of 
formality, estate planning attorneys perpetuate the formalism of will execution by requiring the testa-
tor to comply with all of the formalities of traditional attested wills.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 
524. 
 124.  See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 125.  The lawyer’s office sets the will-execution ceremony apart from the normal routine of life 
because “the moment of executing a will . . . may be one of the few times that [the testator] ever vis-
its a law office.”  Roger W. Andersen, Will Executions: A Modern Guide, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
57, 85–86 (1994).  Although there is no requirement that the will-execution ceremony take place in a 
law office, “[t]estators now tend to sign their wills . . . in a lawyer’s office.”  Bruce H. Mann, Self-
Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 49 (1985). 
 126.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 242–43 (explaining that “the careful lawyer in our 
highly mobile society should draw a will and have it executed in a manner that satisfies the formal 
requirements in all states” rather than having it executed in a manner that complies with formalities 
required in the state of execution). 
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elements of the will-execution ceremony and provide the execution of a 
will a ritualistic character.  The formalities lend will execution its cere-
monial nature by symbolizing the importance and legal significance of 
the testamentary act.  Moreover, the estate planning attorney who assists 
the testator during the will-execution ceremony perpetuates the ritualistic 
character of executing a written, signed, and attested document.  Testa-
mentary formality therefore serves a therapeutic function not only by 
providing the testator a safe harbor for the valid exercise of testamentary 
freedom and encouraging the testator to seek legal assistance, but also by 
lending the will-execution process its ritualistic character. 
B. Antitherapeutic Aspects of Testamentary Formality 
Although testamentary formality promotes several of the positive 
psychological aspects of estate planning, a therapeutic jurisprudential 
analysis also recognizes that will formalities may have antitherapeutic 
consequences.  Mirroring its therapeutic qualities, testamentary formali-
ty’s antitherapeutic aspects are those characteristics of will formalities 
that either magnify the antitherapeutic consequences of estate planning 
or diminish the positive psychological qualities of the process.  When 
analyzed from this therapeutic jurisprudential perspective, one primary 
antitherapeutic consequence of testamentary formality emerges, namely 
that formality represents an impediment to the exercise of testamentary 
freedom. 
Testamentary freedom allows the testator to craft an estate plan that 
best meets her testamentary preferences.127  This freedom can have a va-
riety of positive psychological consequences for the testator.128  Howev-
er, although the testator enjoys broad liberty to craft the substance of her 
estate plan, the law has long placed restrictions on the form of the testa-
tor’s will.129  The testator cannot execute a will by any method that she 
chooses; rather, she must comply with the requirements imposed by tes-
tamentary formality.130  Moreover, the law traditionally has mandated 
strict literal compliance with these formalities, which generally requires 
the invalidation of a will for any failure to comply with the prescribed 
                                                          
 127.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 128.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 129.  See Friedman, supra note 95, at 365 (“‘[F]ree testation’ refers only to the choice of people 
who are to share in one’s estate; it does not apply to the manner in which the document of gift is 
drawn up.”). 
 130.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 226–27. 
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formalities, no matter how small or technical the formal defect.131 
Because the testator must strictly comply with the formal require-
ments of will execution, testamentary formality represents an impedi-
ment to the exercise of testamentary freedom.132  Indeed, the testator may 
view compliance with the prescribed will formalities as a burden.  As 
such, “will making may seem daunting and the formality and ritualized 
nature of the venture may act as a barrier for people who might otherwise 
make a will.”133  Additionally, the strict compliance requirement fre-
quently frustrates testamentary intent, as courts have long invalidated 
wills despite clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended to 
exercise testamentary freedom.134  As one New Jersey judge explained, 
“A writing may express clearly the wish or intention of a decedent, but if 
the statutory formalities have not been followed, it is not a valid will, be-
cause it cannot be a question of what he intended to do, but whether he 
has actually followed the provisions of the statute.”135 
In sum, when coupled with a rule of strict compliance, testamentary 
formality represents an impediment to the exercise of testamentary free-
dom because it can dissuade attempts to execute wills and is a basis to 
invalidate formally defective testamentary documents.  Because testa-
mentary formality impedes the exercise of testamentary freedom, it is al-
so a barrier to the testator’s enjoyment of the positive psychological con-
sequences of estate planning.  This negative psychological consequence 
of will formalities therefore represents one antitherapeutic aspect of tes-
tamentary formality. 
Despite this antitherapeutic effect, testamentary formality maintains 
its overall therapeutic function.  In fact, this antitherapeutic quality of 
impeding testamentary freedom is not primarily a consequence of testa-
mentary formality, but instead is properly understood as a negative psy-
chological consequence of the formalism that mandates strict literal 
                                                          
 131.  See id. at 228. 
 132.  Glover, supra note 85, at 431–34; see Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 114, at 18 (“Doctrinal 
barriers to the effectuation of intent are raised most frequently by the requirements of the statutes of 
wills . . . .”). 
 133.  JOEL C. DOBRIS & STEWART E. STERK, RITCHIE, ALFORD AND EFFLAND’S ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 194–95 (9th ed. 1998). 
 134.  See Mann, supra note 125, at 39 (“Courts routinely invalidate wills because of minor de-
fects in execution, even when no one questions that the will represents the wishes and intent of the 
testator.”); see, e.g., In re Will of McElwaine, 18 N.J. Eq. 499, 504 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1867) (“I have 
no doubt that this paper was intended by the testatrix as her will, and that but for the [will formality] 
statute, it ought to have effect given to it so far as she had legal power to make a will.”). 
 135.  Murray v. Lewis, 121 A. 525, 527 (N.J. Ch. 1923). 
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compliance with the prescribed formalities.  The formalities of writing, 
signature, and attestation do not themselves present an obstacle to the 
testator’s enjoyment of testamentary freedom.  Instead, the rule of strict 
compliance is the hurdle over which testators must pass before exercising 
their freedom of testation. 
If the rule of strict compliance were replaced by a more lenient rule 
of formal compliance—such as the harmless error rule or the substantial 
compliance doctrine—testamentary formality would not significantly 
impede the exercise of testamentary freedom because, pursuant to such 
relaxed compliance rules, a will would be valid despite minor formal 
compliance errors.136  Absent the requirement that the testator strictly 
comply with the prescribed will formalities, the testator would more like-
ly execute a valid will and more easily exercise the freedom of testa-
tion.137  When viewed from this perspective, the rule of strict compliance 
represents the testator’s most significant barrier to the exercise of testa-
mentary freedom.  The positive psychological consequences of will for-
malities therefore outweigh their antitherapeutic qualities, and, as a re-
sult, testamentary formality serves a therapeutic function. 
IV. THE THERAPEUTIC EFFECT OF REFORM 
After identifying the law’s therapeutic and antitherapeutic conse-
quences, the second step of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis is to ex-
amine how the law’s overall therapeutic potential can be maximized.138  
Instead of suggesting new reforms of the will-execution process, this sec-
tion analyzes two developments that threaten to undermine the therapeu-
tic function of testamentary formality by diminishing the role of formali-
ty in the law of succession.  Critics increasingly admonish will 
formalities for undermining testamentary intent because, under the tradi-
tional rule of strict compliance, any minor defect invalidates the will.139  
                                                          
 136.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 137.  See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 274 
(1996) (explaining that by reforming the formal requirements of will execution “the drafters [of the 
Uniform Probate Code] believe they have removed a needless barrier to the probate of documents 
that embody testamentary intent.”). 
 138.  See Schultz, supra note 13, at 54 (stating that it is possible to maximize the law’s overall 
therapeutic potential by “incorporat[ing] these social science findings into the law-making process so 
as to fine-tune the outcomes to the desired therapeutic level”). 
 139.  See Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 611–12 (W. Va. 1998) (Workman, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority opinion, which upheld a strict compliance standard, for “tak[ing] a very 
technocratic approach to the law [and] slavishly worshipping form over substance”); Langbein, su-
pra note 84, at 489. 
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Such criticism fuels a law reform movement that has proposed two types 
of reforms.  One suggested reform reduces the level of formality so as to 
minimize the formal burdens of will execution.140  The second proposed 
reform relaxes the insistence on strict literal compliance, thereby allow-
ing validation of a formally deficient testamentary document if the testa-
tor clearly intended to execute a will.141 
Both the reduction of testamentary formality and the relaxation of 
strict testamentary formalism diminish formality’s role in the process of 
posthumous wealth transmission.  Because will formalities foster the 
therapeutic potential of estate planning, any changes that lessen formali-
ty’s role in the law of succession could undermine the therapeutic func-
tion of will formalities.  A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of testa-
mentary formality should therefore explore the potential therapeutic and 
antitherapeutic consequences of these reforms. 
A. Reduced Testamentary Formality 
The first proposed reform of the law of wills that threatens to under-
mine the therapeutic function of will formalities is the reduction of tes-
tamentary formality.  Legal scholars and policymakers have proposed to 
implement this general reform in a variety of ways.  First, as recom-
mended by the Uniform Law Commission, the number of ancillary for-
malities, or those other than the primary formalities of writing, signature, 
and attestation, could be reduced.  Second, the primary formality of attes-
tation could be eliminated, as some in the legal academy have suggested.  
Finally, as authorized by the 2008 amendments to the Uniform Probate 
Code (UPC), wills that lack attestation could be valid if witnessed by a 
notary public. 
1. Reduction of Ancillary Formalities 
In addition to the primary will formalities of writing, signature, and 
attestation,142 a testator traditionally must comply with a variety of ancil-
lary formalities to validly execute a will.143  For example, some states 
                                                          
 140.  See, e.g., James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. 
REV. 541, 542 (1990) (proposing the abolition of the attestation requirement). 
 141.  See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 84, at 489 (advocating for substantial compliance); Lang-
bein, supra note 87, at 6–7 (arguing in favor of the harmless error rule). 
 142.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 226. 
 143.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 490. 
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impose a presence requirement, which mandates that the testator and the 
attesting witnesses be in each other’s physical presence when the will is 
signed.144  Other ancillary will formalities include subscription, which 
requires that the testator affix her signature to the end of the testamentary 
document, and publication, which requires that the testator announce to 
the attesting witnesses that the document before them is her will.145 
Despite the long history of these ancillary formalities, the drafters of 
the 1969 UPC broke from tradition and removed the presence, subscrip-
tion, and publication requirements from the list of required will-
execution formalities.146  The official comment to the relevant provision 
describes the effect of this change: “The formalities for execution of a 
witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum.”147  The official com-
ment continues by explaining the purpose of this reform: “The intent is to 
validate wills which meet the minimal formalities of the statute.”148  
Thus, the drafters of the UPC were concerned with validating testamen-
tary documents that are genuine expressions of testamentary intent but 
which do not comply with the previously required ancillary formalities.  
As Professor John Langbein explains, “Doubtless the draftsmen balanced 
the injustice brought about by technical violations of the publication and 
presence requirements and decided that the . . . value of those two former 
requisites was not worth the price in wills invalidated for defective com-
pliance.”149 
This rationale underlying the reduction of ancillary will formalities 
corresponds nicely with one antitherapeutic consequence of testamentary 
formality.  Specifically, when examined from a therapeutic jurispruden-
tial perspective, the reduction of ancillary testamentary formality directly 
addresses the role that formalities play in impeding the exercise of testa-
mentary freedom.  As discussed previously, freedom of testation can pos-
itively affect the psychological well-being of the testator;150 however, 
                                                          
 144.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 233. 
 145.  Id. at 243 n.12. 
 146.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008), 8 U.C.L.A. 136 (Supp. 2012). 
 147.  Id. § 2-502 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 351. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 511; see also Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accom-
modating the Erring and the Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 392 (2001) (explaining that the 
reduction of ancillary will formalities was implemented “[t]o minimize the situations in which impo-
sition of formalities will preclude probate of instruments intended to constitute wills . . . .”); Leslie, 
supra note 137, at 242 (explaining that the “changes were made to ensure courts would ‘validate the 
will whenever possible’”). 
 150.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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will formalities impose a technical hurdle over which the testator must 
pass to validly exercise this freedom.151  This consequence of formality is 
antitherapeutic because it minimizes the therapeutic potential of testa-
mentary freedom.  The elimination of the presence, publication, and sub-
scription requirements diminishes this antitherapeutic effect by removing 
some of the obstacles that a testator must navigate to exercise freedom of 
testation.152  In this respect, the reduction of ancillary testamentary for-
mality is a therapeutic reform of the law of wills. 
This increased access to testamentary freedom, together with the im-
pact of reduced ancillary formality on other therapeutic and antitherapeu-
tic qualities of will formalities, produces a net therapeutic result.  Con-
sider, for example, the therapeutic consequence of the safe harbor that 
formalities create for the exercise of testamentary freedom.  Because 
compliance with the prescribed formalities reliably signals that the testa-
tor intended the document to be a will, the testator is assured that her tes-
tamentary intent will be fulfilled.153  Therefore, testamentary formality, 
and the safe harbor that it creates, bolsters the therapeutic qualities of tes-
tamentary freedom.  Although elimination of some primary formalities 
likely would diminish the therapeutic quality of the testamentary safe 
harbor,154 reduction of ancillary will formalities would not weaken the 
testator’s assurance that her testamentary preferences will be fulfilled.155  
Indeed, because the writing, signature, and attestation requirements gen-
erally create a reliable safe harbor,156 state legislatures can safely remove 
some or all of the ancillary formalities from their state’s probate code 
“without reducing the certainty about which writings will and will not 
qualify” for the protections of the safe harbor.157 
Consider also the positive psychological consequences of the will-
                                                          
 151.  See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See Champine, supra note 149, at 393 (“Reduction of formalities limits the possibility that 
defective execution will preclude probate . . . .”); Lindgren, supra note 140, at 568 (“These arguably 
nonpurposive rules can easily derail an innocent testator and should be eliminated even if the attesta-
tion requirement were retained.”). 
 153.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 154.  See infra Part IV.A.2 (arguing that complete abolition of the attestation requirement would 
negatively affect the positive psychological consequences of the will-execution process). 
 155.  See Champine, supra note 149, at 393 (noting that the “[r]eduction of formalities limits the 
possibility that defective execution will preclude probate . . . .”). 
 156.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 511 (explaining that the reduction of ancillary formality 
“suggest[s] that it is primarily the evidentiary and channeling purposes of the Wills Act which sur-
vive in modern times.”); Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1031–32 (arguing that the safe harbor would 
remain even if the attestation requirement were abolished). 
 157.  Champine, supra note 149, at 393. 
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execution ceremony.158  The ritualistic nature of the will-execution pro-
cess can positively influence the testator’s psychological well-being.159  
The process achieves this ceremonial quality through the requirement 
that the testator comply with various formalities.160  Because they are 
among the elements that comprise the will-execution ceremony, elimina-
tion of ancillary testamentary formalities could diminish the ritualistic 
nature of will execution.  However, like the secondary importance of the 
presence, publication, and subscription requirements in creating the tes-
tamentary safe harbor, ancillary will formalities likewise are less signifi-
cant in creating the ceremony of will execution.  Instead, the primary 
formal requirements of writing, signature, and attestation are the main 
components of the will-execution ceremony,161 and, in this regard, the 
participation of witnesses is of utmost significance.162  Therefore, while 
attestation “is the major factor in ceremonializing the execution,” the an-
cillary formalities of presence, subscription, and publication contribute 
only incrementally to the ritual of will execution.163  As a result, the re-
duction of ancillary formalities would not reduce the therapeutic poten-
tial of the will-execution ceremony. 
As demonstrated above, a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals 
that the reduction of ancillary testamentary formality is a therapeutic re-
form of the law of wills.  The reduction of ancillary formality bolsters the 
overall therapeutic potential of will execution by removing some of the 
obstacles that the testator faces when exercising testamentary freedom.  
In fact, the goal of this reform is to significantly alleviate this antithera-
peutic consequence of testamentary formality.164  Also contributing to the 
net therapeutic result is that this reform neither magnifies testamentary 
formality’s other antitherapeutic qualities, nor diminishes its positive 
psychological consequences.  Because the reduction of ancillary testa-
mentary formality increases the law’s therapeutic potential by eliminat-
ing barriers to the exercise of testamentary freedom, while also maintain-
ing the therapeutic status quo with respect to other consequences of 
testamentary formality, the elimination of the presence, subscription, and 
                                                          
 158.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
 159.  See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
 161.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 497. 
 162.  See id. at 521 (explaining that the participation of people other than the testator ceremonial-
izes the process). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
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publication requirements is an overall therapeutic reform of the law of 
succession. 
2. Elimination of the Attestation Requirement 
Similar to the reduction of ancillary will formalities, Professor James 
Lindgren has argued for the elimination of the attestation requirement.165  
This reform of the will-execution process would, however, negatively 
affect the therapeutic function of testamentary formality.  As previously 
discussed, one therapeutic consequence of will formalities is that they 
provide a safe harbor for the exercise of testamentary power.166  The tes-
tator knows that if she complies with the required formalities, her testa-
mentary intent will be legally recognized.167  As a result, the knowledge 
that her testamentary preferences will be honored bolsters the therapeutic 
consequences of testamentary freedom.168  By contrast, when coupled 
with a rule of strict compliance, testamentary formality can also signifi-
cantly impede the exercise of testamentary freedom.169  This conse-
quence of testamentary formality can negatively affect the testator’s psy-
chological well-being because her testamentary preferences might be 
ignored due to a minor formal defect.170 
The elimination of the attestation requirement would affect these 
therapeutic and antitherapeutic qualities of testamentary formality by ex-
panding the scope of the testamentary safe harbor.  In other words, a 
broader range of documents would fall within the safe harbor’s protec-
tion.  No longer would a testamentary document need to be attested by 
two witnesses—any signed writing would satisfy the safe harbor’s re-
quirements.  This expansion would have two consequences.  First, the 
safe harbor could become overinclusive because documents that were not 
intended to be testamentary in nature could be considered legally valid 
wills.171  Second, as the proponents of this reform intend, the burdens of 
                                                          
 165.  Lindgren, supra note 140, at 543; Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1024–30.  Other scholars 
agree.  See, e.g., C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An 
Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward 
Amorphism, Part Two: Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503 and a Counterproposal, 43 FLA. L. 
REV. 599, 717 (1991). 
 166.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 167.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 168.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 169.  See supra Part III.B. 
 170.  See supra Part III.B. 
 171.  See Miller, supra note 116, at 277 (explaining that “[c]ompliance with the attestation re-
quirement produces a ‘virtually unmistakable testamentary act’” but that “[c]ompliance with the re-
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bringing a document within the safe harbor would ease because the testa-
tor would have to comply with fewer formalities to validly execute a 
will.172 
The expanded scope of the testamentary safe harbor, perhaps to the 
point of overinclusiveness, would not affect the therapeutic consequenc-
es of testamentary freedom.  Those who desire to execute a will would 
still have a definitive method of entering the safe harbor.  The lower bur-
den of placing a document within the safe harbor, however, likely would 
affect the therapeutic consequences of testamentary freedom.  On the one 
hand, without an attestation requirement, the testator would have to over-
come one fewer hurdle to fall within the safe harbor, thereby providing 
the testator more confidence that she will enjoy the safe harbor’s protec-
tions.173  On the other hand, the safe harbor’s protections would weaken 
because the testator would have less certainty that documents that fall 
within the safe harbor would be recognized as legally valid wills.174  In-
deed, even when a decedent qualifies for the safe harbor, a contestant of 
the will can argue nonetheless that the decedent did not intend to execute 
a will.175 
Put succinctly, the safe harbor would become less safe.  Without the 
precisely defined safe harbor that attestation provides, the issue of 
whether a decedent intended a particular document to be testamentary in 
nature would more likely be disputed176 and a contestant of the will 
would more easily overcome the presumption of testamentary intent that 
the safe harbor triggers.  Consequently, some documents that were in-
                                                                                                                                  
 
quirements for a holographic will,” which does require attestation, “often fails to distinguish the 
writing intended to be given effect as a will from the signed and dated letter, memorandum, or draft 
containing statements about the disposition of the decedent’s property.”). 
 172.  See Champine, supra note 149, at 393 (“Reduction of formalities limits the possibility that 
defective execution will preclude probate . . . .”); Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative In-
tent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 614 (1988) (“The reduction in legal formalities minimizes the number of 
cases in which property owners take actions indicating that they probably intend to made a donative 
transfer, but, nevertheless, fail to meet the formalities . . . .”). 
 173.  See Lindgren, supra note 140, at 572 (explaining that if the attestation requirement were 
abolished “[l]itigation about formalities would largely disappear . . . .”). 
 174.  See id. (explaining that if the attestation requirement were abolished “litigation about tes-
tamentary intent would increase” and explaining further that “instead of judging litigation over 
whether there was adequate publication or whether the witnesses signed before the testator, the 
courts would try to decide whether a signed writing disposing of the testator’s property was actually 
intended to be his will.”); see also Langbein, supra note 87, at 6 (explaining that “high levels of 
formality . . . enhance the safe harbor that is created for the careful testator who complies ful-
ly . . . .”). 
 175.  Lindgren, supra note 140, at 572. 
 176.  See id. 
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tended to be wills and that fulfilled the formal requirements of the safe 
harbor could nevertheless be invalidated because attestation, which pro-
vides reliable objective evidence of testamentary intent,177 would no 
longer be required.  The elimination of the attestation requirement could 
therefore have both a positive and a negative effect on the therapeutic 
consequences of testamentary freedom because, although the testator 
would have less trouble entering the safe harbor, the safe harbor’s protec-
tion would be diminished.  As a result, the net effect of the elimination of 
attestation on the therapeutic potential of testamentary freedom is am-
biguous. 
Although the cumulative effect of this reform on the therapeutic con-
sequences of freedom of testation is unclear, such a reform would lessen 
the testator’s incentive to consult an estate planning attorney and conse-
quently would diminish the lawyer’s role as a therapeutic agent.178  As 
previously discussed, the formal requirements of will execution provide 
the testator an incentive to seek legal advice during the will-execution 
process.179  However, without an attestation requirement, this incentive 
would be weakened because the overall level of formality would be re-
duced, and the testator’s perceived need for legal assistance consequently 
would be diminished. 
This effect of eliminating the attestation requirement is manifest in 
statutes that authorize holographic wills.  A holographic will is a testa-
mentary document that is handwritten by the testator and is valid without 
attestation.180  The traditionally accepted justification for holographic 
wills is that the reduced formality enables the testator to prepare a will at 
home without the aid of an attorney.181  Both the drafters of statutes that 
authorize holographic wills and probate courts that determine their valid-
ity have explained that the purpose of this reduced formality is to provide 
                                                          
 177.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 494 (“[T]he formalities for witnessed wills call for a virtu-
ally unmistakable testamentary act . . . .”).  Indeed, when the level of formality is low, cases are 
“bound to arise in which the court must decide whether the decedent meant the writing to be a will.”  
Id. at 515. 
 178.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 179.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
 180.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 268; see also Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph 
Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2006) (“[S]tatutes that 
authorize holographic wills create an exception to the nearly universal rule that a valid will must be 
witnessed.”). 
 181.  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 180, at 127–28; Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An 
Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 27, 30 
(2008) (“Without hiring a lawyer or involving witnesses, testators in some jurisdictions easily can 
put pen to paper, secure in the knowledge that the law must honor their final wishes.”). 
GLOVER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2012  5:11 PM 
2012] TESTAMENTARY FORMALITY 167 
those who are unable or unwilling to engage an attorney an opportunity 
to validly exercise testamentary power.182  Therefore, by eliminating the 
attestation requirement, holographic will statutes encourage the execu-
tion of wills without the aid of lawyers.183 
The elimination of the attestation requirement, which is the defining 
characteristic of witnessed wills, would eliminate most of the distinction 
between formally attested wills and holographic wills.  Therefore, be-
cause “[l]egislative recognition of the holographic form . . . encourages 
testators to draw their own wills,”184 legislative approval of reduced for-
mality for all testamentary documents would gradually decrease the tes-
tator’s incentive to engage an estate planning attorney.185  As a result, the 
lawyer’s role as a therapeutic agent for the testator would be weakened 
and the therapeutic potential of the will-execution process would be di-
minished. 
In addition to diminishing the therapeutic role of the estate planning 
attorney, the reduction of testamentary formality through the elimination 
of the attestation requirement would lessen the therapeutic benefit of the 
will-execution ceremony.186  Formalities are the central elements of the 
will-execution process and provide the process its ritualistic character by 
distinguishing the ceremony from the events of everyday life.187  If the 
testator no longer had to fulfill an attestation requirement, the will-
                                                          
 182.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (1969) (“For persons unable to obtain legal assis-
tance, the holographic will may be adequate.”); In re Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1121–
22 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (“The principal value of an [h]olographic testament is simplicity.  It can be 
confected by a layman without the assistance of legal counsel.”); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 
456, 460 (W. Va. 1982) (“The purpose behind statutory recognition of holographic wills is to enable 
those persons who are unable or unwilling to secure the assistance of counsel to make a valid will in 
their own handwriting.”); see also Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of 
Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 160 (1988) (“Legislatures authorize holograph-
ic wills as a means of convenience to testators, enabling those who are either unable or unwilling to 
obtain legal assistance to make a valid will in their own handwriting.”). 
 183.  See In re Soher’s Estate, 21 P. 8, 10 (Cal. 1889) (explaining that “testators are to be en-
couraged by [holographic will] statute[s] . . . to draw their own wills . . . .”); Brown, supra note 180, 
at 127 (arguing for the abolition of holographic wills to “encourage testators to seek professional 
guidance in the preparation of their wills”); Natale, supra note 182, at 177 n.98 (explaining that by 
authorizing holographic wills “legislatures encourage the informal drafting of wills by lay persons 
with no legal training or professional advice”). 
 184.  Gail Boreman Bird, Sleight of Handwriting: The Holographic Will in California, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 605, 631 (1981). 
 185.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 165, at 630 (stating that holding holographic wills as enforcea-
ble creates freedom and flexibility); Note, Holographic Wills in Virginia: Problems at Probate, 45 
VA. L. REV. 613, 628 (1959) (stating that a “statute that permits holographs encourages informal 
drafting”). 
 186.  See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 187.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
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execution ceremony would lose this unique characteristic and its ritualis-
tic nature would be diminished because the execution of a will would 
more closely resemble less significant transactions.188 
Of course, the elimination of the attestation requirement would not 
negatively affect the ritualistic character of will execution if testators 
continued to have their wills witnessed.  In fact, the proposals to abolish 
the attestation requirement acknowledge that witnessed wills are desira-
ble, and the proponents of these plans suggest that testators can be en-
couraged to have their wills witnessed even without mandatory invalida-
tion of unattested documents.189  For example, requiring attestation only 
for self-proving wills or making attestation an aspirational requirement 
could encourage the continued use of witnesses in the will-execution 
process.190  The effectiveness of these incentives, however, depends 
largely on estate planning lawyers advising their clients of the adminis-
trative advantages of fulfilling a nonobligatory attestation requirement.191 
Although estate planning attorneys would likely “opt for maximum 
formality” and continue to have wills witnessed “in order to be in the 
best possible position to defend . . . will[s] against” claims of invalidity 
based upon the absence of testamentary intent,192 testators who lack legal 
assistance would less likely perpetuate attestation’s role in the will-
execution process.  Indeed, statutes that authorize holographic wills 
acknowledge that testators who attempt to exercise testamentary power 
without the aid of an attorney are less likely to involve witnesses in the 
                                                          
 188.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 508 (“[W]ithout the somber ceremony of attestation, the 
forms of transfer are closer to those of everyday routine . . . .”); Lindgren, supra note 140, at 541 
(explaining that “[t]he most characteristic formality of a typical will is the requirement that a will be 
attested by two (or three) witnesses.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 189.  See Lindgren, supra note 140, at 572 (“We can secure the benefits of the attestation re-
quirement for almost all wills without punishing those few testators who stumble along the way.”); 
Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1026 (discussing alternatives to mandatory attestation). 
 190.  Lindgren, supra note 140, at 570–71; see also Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1026 (adding 
that the dispensing power is another method to encourage attestation). 
 191.  In his proposal to abolish the attestation requirement, Professor Lindgren acknowledges the 
lawyer’s role in encouraging the continued observance of attestation.  See Lindgren, supra note 140, 
at 570–72 (explaining that if attestation is required for self-proving wills, estate planning attorneys 
will perpetuate the attestation requirement because “[l]aw firms do not want to have to track down 
witnesses years after the execution of a will” and explaining further that, if attestation is made an 
aspirational requirement, “most people, particularly lawyers, would abide by such a toothless provi-
sion.”); Lindgren, supra note 87, at 1026–27 (explaining that “good firms usually get the witnesses’ 
testimony made part of the will” and proposing a method of encouraging attestation by which “su-
pervising a will execution other than one’s own without using witnesses could subject the lawyer or 
other professional to a fine.”). 
 192.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 524. 
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will-execution process.193  Because reducing testamentary formality 
would diminish the testator’s incentive to seek legal advice,194 the elimi-
nation of mandatory attestation could pose a greater threat to its contin-
ued adherence than proponents of reform recognize.  The ritualistic char-
acter of the will-execution ceremony, and its corresponding therapeutic 
potential, consequently could be diminished by the elimination of the at-
testation requirement, regardless of whether estate planning lawyers con-
tinue to advise their clients of the advantages of witnessed wills. 
All in all, the elimination of the attestation requirement would likely 
have a negative effect on the therapeutic function of testamentary formal-
ity.  The therapeutic consequences of the protections of the testamentary 
safe harbor, of the incentive to seek the aid of an estate planning attor-
ney, and of the ritualistic nature of the will-execution ceremony could all 
be negatively affected by the elimination of the attestation requirement.  
Therefore, when contemplating amending their state’s probate code, pol-
icymakers should consider the antitherapeutic consequences that would 
likely result from eliminating the attestation requirement.  Indeed, thera-
peutic jurisprudence suggests that attestation should continue to be a 
formal requirement of will execution. 
3. Validation of Notarized Wills 
In addition to the reduction of ancillary formalities and the elimina-
tion of the attestation requirement, the authorization of notarized wills is 
another proposed reform of the law of succession.195  This reform is part 
of the 2008 amendments to the UPC and provides that a will is valid if it 
is attested by two witnesses or acknowledged by the testator before a no-
tary public.196  The testator therefore has an option regarding her pre-
ferred method of will execution.  Because this reform renders the attesta-
tion formality optional, the authorization of notarized wills should be 
analyzed within the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate plan-
ning to determine how the reform affects the therapeutic function of tes-
tamentary formality. 
When examined from a therapeutic jurisprudential perspective, the 
notarization option for will execution would increase testation’s thera-
                                                          
 193.  See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See supra notes 180–85 and accompanying text. 
 195.  See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 ACTEC J. 
83 (2008). 
 196.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 136 (Supp. 2012). 
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peutic potential because the reform would weaken the testator’s barrier to 
the exercise of testamentary freedom.  In fact, the drafters of the UPC in-
tended that, by providing an alternative method of will execution, this 
reform would reduce the chances that the testator would execute a for-
mally deficient testamentary document.197  As such, this reform could 
cure a significant number of defective wills, as many people, including 
some lawyers, believe that notarization is a legitimate alternative to attes-
tation.198  By bringing the will-execution process in line with the expecta-
tions of a larger segment of the population and by weakening formality’s 
ability to impede the exercise of testamentary freedom, the authorization 
of notarized wills would bolster the therapeutic qualities of testamentary 
freedom. 
Furthermore, the authorization of notarized wills would not detri-
mentally affect the other aspects of testamentary formality’s therapeutic 
function.  First, when compared with attestation, notarization would pro-
vide equally reliable evidence of testamentary intent199 and would there-
fore create an effective testamentary safe harbor.200  This consequence of 
the notarization option would in turn provide the testator the therapeutic 
benefit of knowing that her testamentary preferences will be fulfilled.201  
Second, because notarization, like attestation, contributes an aura of for-
mality to the process, the notarization requirement would also maintain 
the therapeutic benefit of the will-execution ceremony.202  Both formali-
ties introduce outsiders into the testamentary experience, a characteristic 
                                                          
 197.  See Waggoner, supra 195, at 85 (“As long as it is clear that the decedent adopted the doc-
ument as his or her will, the law has no reason to deny validity on the ground of defective execution.  
The harmless-error rule is one curative measure for this problem.  Allowing notarization as an op-
tional method of execution is another.”). 
 198.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 137 (“[L]ay people (and, sad to say, 
some lawyers) think that a will is valid if notarized, which is not true under non-UPC law.”); see, 
e.g., In re Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201, 202 n.3 (Cal. 2006) (“[T]he only reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the decedent’s conduct is that he believed the notarization would validate his will.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 199.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 137 (explaining that the execution of a will 
under the mistaken belief that notarization and not attestation is a requirement for validity provides 
no “evidence raising any doubt that the will truly represent[s] the decedent’s wishes”); In re Estate 
of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1135–36 (Mont. 2002) (finding that a notarized will provided clear and con-
vincing evidence of testamentary intent); Waggoner, supra note 195, at 84 (“The danger that a nota-
rized will would not reliably represent the decedent’s wishes seems minimal.”). 
 200.  See Waggoner, supra note 195, at 84 (explaining that notarization serves the channeling 
function of testamentary formality). 
 201.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 202.  See Waggoner, supra note 195, at 84 (explaining that notarization serves the cautionary or 
ceremonial function of testamentary formality). 
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that is integral to the ceremony of will execution.203  Notarization would 
therefore maintain the general ritualistic nature of the will-execution pro-
cess.204  Finally, because the will-execution process for notarized wills 
would be as technically complex as that for attested wills, it is unlikely 
that providing the testator a choice between attestation and notarization 
would weaken the testator’s incentive to seek the aid of an estate plan-
ning attorney.  The authorization of notarized wills consequently would 
not diminish the estate planning attorney’s opportunity to serve as a ther-
apeutic agent for her client. 
In sum, the authorization of notarized wills would have a net thera-
peutic effect on the will-execution process.  For instance, the authoriza-
tion of notarized wills would lessen formality’s opportunity to impede 
the exercise of testamentary freedom.  Further, by providing the testator 
an option to comply with the attestation requirement or the notarization 
requirement, this reform would also maintain the therapeutic aspects of 
testamentary formality, including the testamentary safe harbor, the testa-
tor’s incentive to seek legal assistance, and the ritualistic nature of the 
will-execution ceremony.  Therapeutic jurisprudence therefore suggests 
that the authorization of notarized wills is an overall therapeutic reform 
of the law of wills. 
B. Relaxed Testamentary Formalism 
In addition to the reduction of testamentary formality, the law reform 
movement has called for the relaxation of testamentary formalism.  Un-
der the traditional rule of strict compliance, any formal defect invalidates 
a will.205  Consequently, strict compliance has produced situations in 
which testamentary intent is clear, but the will is invalid because the tes-
tator failed to comply with one of the required formalities.206  To avoid 
this frustration of testamentary intent, scholars have proposed two alter-
                                                          
 203.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 497. 
 204.  In this regard, notarization may actually increase the ceremonial quality of will execution 
because whereas attesting witnesses need not have any special qualifications, the notary public is a 
public official with “the foremost duty . . . to screen signers of particularly sensitive instruments . . . 
for their true identity, their willingness to sign without duress or intimidation, and their awareness of 
the general import of the document.”  What is a Notary?, NAT’L NOTARY ASS’N, 
http://www.nationalnotary.org/what_is_notary/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
 205.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 228. 
 206.  See, e.g., Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that the “mere 
intent by a testator to execute a written will is insufficient” because “[t]he actual execution of a writ-
ten will must also comply with the dictates of” the required formalities); Miller, supra note 116, at 
222–23. 
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natives to the rule of strict compliance.  First, the substantial compliance 
doctrine recognizes a will as valid if the testator intends to create a will 
and substantially complies with the required formalities.207  Alternative-
ly, the harmless error rule allows the court to validate a will based solely 
on whether the testator clearly expresses testamentary intent.208 
These alternatives not only would reduce the potential harshness of 
strict compliance, but would also affect the therapeutic function of tes-
tamentary formality.  For example, the relaxation of testamentary formal-
ism would likely increase the therapeutic consequences of the testamen-
tary safe harbor209 and decrease the likelihood that testamentary 
formality will impede the exercise of testamentary freedom.210  Similar to 
the elimination of the attestation requirement, the relaxation of testamen-
tary formalism would reduce the burdens of will execution, thereby re-
ducing the possibility that a court will invalidate a testamentary docu-
ment because of deficient execution.211  Indeed, under both alternatives, a 
probate court will not automatically invalidate a formally deficient will; 
instead, the will’s proponent will have the burden of proving testamen-
tary intent.212  This consequence of relaxed formalism would have posi-
tive therapeutic consequences because it would provide the testator 
greater assurance that a genuine expression of testamentary intent will be 
recognized as legally valid. 
Unlike the reduction of testamentary formality, however, the adop-
tion of the substantial compliance doctrine or the harmless error rule 
would not produce antitherapeutic consequences by reducing the protec-
tions of the safe harbor.  Whereas the elimination of the attestation re-
quirement would increase the likelihood that testamentary intent would 
be disputed,213 the relaxation of testamentary formalism would maintain 
the current level of certainty that documents satisfying the safe harbor’s 
requirements will be recognized as legally valid wills.214  The validity of 
                                                          
 207.  Langbein, supra note 84, at 489. 
 208.  See Langbein, supra note 87, at 5–7. 
 209.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 210.  See supra Part III.B. 
 211.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 489 (explaining the rationale of the substantial compliance 
doctrine: “The finding of a formal defect should lead not to automatic invalidity, but to a further in-
quiry: does the noncomplying document express the decedent’s testamentary intent, and does its 
form sufficiently approximate Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude that it serves the 
purposes of the Wills Act?”). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 214.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 525 (“The substantial compliance doctrine would pertain 
not to every will, but to that fraction of wills where the testator . . . has failed to comply fully with 
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some documents that appear testamentary in nature may still be ques-
tioned,215 but most testators who leave behind written, signed, and attest-
ed wills would be assured that their testamentary preferences will be 
honored.216 
In sum, a rule of relaxed testamentary formalism “makes the[] for-
malities for execution a mere safe harbor,” as “those who seek absolute 
certainty may comply with such formalities and are assured that the law 
will recognize their wills as validly executed”; however, those who fail 
to strictly comply are not foreclosed from exercising testamentary power 
through the execution of a will.217  The relaxed formalism of the substan-
tial compliance doctrine and the harmless error rule therefore likely 
would have therapeutic consequences because the testator can be certain 
that her testamentary preferences will be honored if she complies with 
the prescribed formalities, but she need not worry that a minor defect in 
execution will automatically invalidate the will. 
The adoption of the substantial compliance doctrine or the harmless 
error rule, however, could reduce the estate planning attorney’s role as a 
therapeutic agent for her client218 and diminish the ritualistic nature of 
the will-execution ceremony.219  Much like the effect of eliminating the 
attestation requirement,220 a rule of relaxed testamentary formalism could 
encourage testators to execute wills informally and without the assistance 
of a lawyer.  Because a formal defect would no longer automatically in-
validate an attempted expression of testamentary intent, the harsh conse-
quences of forgoing legal assistance would be reduced and consequently 
the testator’s incentive to consult an estate planning attorney would be 
diminished.221  The relaxation of testamentary formalism could also en-
                                                                                                                                  
 
the Wills Act formalities.”); Langbein, supra note 87, at 52 (explaining that the harmless error rule 
“has left unaffected the estates of testators who have complied fully with the Wills Act formali-
ties.”). 
 215.  See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 92, at 541–42 (discussing “the so-called ‘sham will’ 
cases”). 
 216.  See Miller, supra note 116, at 274–75 (stating that a signed will “produces a powerful in-
ference of validity by creating a presumption that the recitals in the signature and attestation clauses 
are true.”). 
 217.  E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital 
Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1085 (1999). 
 218.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 219.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
 220.  See supra notes 186–95 and accompanying text. 
 221.  See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the incentive that legal formalities provide for the testa-
tor to engage an estate planning attorney).  But see Langbein, supra note 84, at 524 (arguing that 
relaxed testamentary formalism “would not attract the reliance of amateurs, nor increase the number 
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courage the testator to abandon strict adherence to the formalities of will 
execution because simpler and cheaper methods of executing a will 
would be legally valid.222  Consequently, such a reform could diminish 
the therapeutic qualities of the will-execution ceremony. 
Moreover, regardless of whether testators and estate planning law-
yers would continue to observe will formalities despite a rule of relaxed 
formalism, both the substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless er-
ror rule could diminish the ritual of will execution because the formalism 
that mandates invariable compliance with the formalities of will execu-
tion is a fundamental aspect of the ceremony’s ritualistic character.223  
Simply by rendering compliance with formality discretionary, a rule of 
relaxed formalism would diminish this ritualistic trait, even if testators 
continued to strictly comply.  Tacitly recognizing this erosion of will ex-
ecution’s ritualism, those who argue that testators would continue to 
strictly comply despite the relaxation of testamentary formalism concede 
that “[a]t a minimum, the mystique surrounding wills, which leads most 
lay people to believe that a will is a solemn transaction in which they 
should seek legal assistance, could eventually disappear.”224 
Despite this antitherapeutic potential, a reduction in the average tes-
tator’s compliance with will formalities would likely be small and gradu-
al because the testator would retain a strong incentive to strictly com-
ply.225  For example, if executed informally, a will would not qualify for 
the protections of the testamentary safe harbor, and the issue of testamen-
                                                                                                                                  
 
of homemade wills.”). 
 222.  See Hirsch, supra note 95, at 1067 n.33 (explaining that “[t]he ex ante consequence of [re-
laxed formalism] could be greater laxity in fulfilling formal requirements . . . .”); Miller, supra note 
165, at 707 (“A potential objection to a harmless error rule . . . is that permitting the courts to vali-
date defective wills may eventually undercut the standard set by the wills act.”); Emily Sherwin, 
Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between 
Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 468 (2002) (“If it is generally under-
stood that judges have the power to dispense with formality requirements . . . testators might come to 
believe that the statutory procedures are no longer necessary.  Accordingly, they might gradually 
abandon traditional testamentary procedures in favor of other, perhaps cheaper, means of expressing 
testamentary intent.”).  But see Langbein, supra note 84, at 524 (arguing that relaxed testamentary 
formalism “would have no effect whatever upon primary conduct.”). 
 223.  See supra notes 106–14 and accompanying text. 
 224.  Sherwin, supra note 222, at 469. 
 225.  See id. (“[T]he premise of the argument, that a dispensation rule will lead to lax testamen-
tary practices, may be incorrect.  A testator sufficiently informed to know of the will statutes has 
powerful reason to follow them, whether or not courts have authority to accept defective wills.”); see 
also J.G. Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution of Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 559, 
577 (1987) (arguing that relaxed formalism will not “breed some contempt for the prescribed formal-
ities” because “human instinct is more likely to lead to a desire to do things properly . . . .”). 
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tary intent would more likely be litigated.226  The testator consequently 
would have an incentive to comply with the prescribed formalities to 
qualify for the protections of the testamentary safe harbor and avoid the 
expense and inconvenience of probate litigation.227  Because informal 
will execution is “hardly an enticing option,”228 the decrease in the testa-
tor’s incentive to comply with the prescribed formalities and engage an 
estate planning attorney therefore would likely be minimal.  In fact, this 
intuition is confirmed by the experience of foreign jurisdictions that have 
abandoned strict formal compliance without discernibly increasing the 
use of informal methods of will execution in the decades following the 
abandonment of the rule.229 
In sum, by abandoning strict compliance, the relaxation of testamen-
tary formalism could potentially weaken the testator’s incentive to strict-
ly comply with the prescribed formalities and to seek the aid of an estate 
planning attorney.  Consequently, to some minimal extent, the adoption 
of the substantial compliance doctrine or the harmless error rule could 
diminish the therapeutic consequences of the will-execution ceremony 
and decrease the estate planning attorney’s role as therapeutic agent.  
However, the threat of these antitherapeutic effects is minor, because a 
rule of relaxed testamentary formalism maintains the protections of the 
testamentary safe harbor, and the experience of other jurisdictions sug-
gests that such a reform only minimally, if at all, diminishes the testator’s 
incentive to seek legal advice and strictly comply.  Because they assist 
the testator in avoiding potentially burdensome estate litigation over tes-
tamentary intent, will formalities are “naturally resilient,”230 and would 
likely continue to provide the testator a robust incentive to avoid infor-
mal methods of will execution, even if a rule of relaxed formalism were 
adopted.  Therefore, the positive psychological consequences of remov-
ing the impediment of strict testamentary formalism from the testator’s 
exercise of testamentary freedom likely outweigh any potential antither-
                                                          
 226.  See Spitko, supra note 217, at 1085–86. 
 227.  See Langbein, supra note 84, at 524 (“The incentive for due execution would remain.  Pre-
cisely because the substantial compliance doctrine is a rule of litigation, it would have no place in 
professional estate planning.”). 
 228.   Langbein, supra note 87, at 23; see Langbein, supra note 84, at 524. 
 229.  See Langbein, supra note 87, at 51–52 (concluding after a review of the experience of a 
variety of foreign jurisdictions that a rule of relaxed formalism has not “inspired testators to become 
sloppy about executing their wills . . . .”); Miller, supra note 116, at 319 (explaining that south Aus-
tralia’s rule of relaxed formalism has not affected the attitude toward formalities). 
 230.  Sherwin, supra note 222, at 475 (explaining further that “will formalities are unlike typical 
rules of conduct, which actors may have strong reasons to disregard if courts treat the rules as advi-
sory rather than mandatory.”). 
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apeutic effects of abandoning the rule of strict compliance. 
All told, because relaxed testamentary formalism would affect testa-
mentary formality’s therapeutic function, therapeutic consequences are 
relevant considerations when evaluating proposals to adopt the substan-
tial compliance doctrine or the harmless error rule.  When employed in 
this context, therapeutic jurisprudence ultimately suggests that the refor-
mation of the law of wills to include a relaxed compliance rule would 
likely produce a net therapeutic result.  Thus, therapeutic jurisprudence 
adds to the resounding call for reform with respect to strict testamentary 
formalism and suggests that state legislatures should amend their probate 
codes to include a rule of relaxed formal compliance.  A therapeutic ju-
risprudential analysis therefore not only recognizes testamentary formali-
ty’s therapeutic function, but also provides the law reform movement 
new insights regarding strict testamentary formalism that strengthen the 
case for reform. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals that testamentary for-
mality serves a therapeutic function.231  As part of the larger context of 
preparing and implementing an estate plan, will formalities fulfill their 
therapeutic function by interacting with the therapeutic and antitherapeu-
tic qualities of the estate planning process.  This process has a number of 
positive and negative psychological consequences, all of which affect the 
psychological well-being of the testator.232  This Article argues that tes-
tamentary formality enhances the overall therapeutic potential of the es-
tate planning process by bolstering the positive psychological conse-
quences of preparing an estate plan and diminishing the process’s 
antitherapeutic qualities. 
The recognition of testamentary formality’s therapeutic function rep-
resents the first step of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis.233  The se-
cond step of the process entails employing the therapeutic and antithera-
peutic consequences of the law as a framework through which to analyze 
potential law reforms and identify ways to maximize the law’s overall 
therapeutic potential.234  Given this goal, therapeutic jurisprudence re-
veals the need to analyze how the various proposed reforms of the will-
                                                          
 231.  See supra Part III. 
 232.  See Glover, supra note 1, at 433–61. 
 233.  See supra Part II.A. 
 234.  See supra Part II.A. 
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execution process would affect testamentary formality’s therapeutic 
function. 
The law reform movement in the law of wills has proposed two gen-
eral types of reforms, both of which lessen formality’s role in the estate 
planning process and therefore threaten to undermine formality’s thera-
peutic function.  These reforms consist of the reduction of testamentary 
formality235 and the relaxation of testamentary formalism.236  The reduc-
tion of testamentary formality entails eliminating or replacing some of 
the traditionally required formal elements of will execution, including 
reducing ancillary testamentary formality, eliminating the attestation re-
quirement, and authorizing notarized wills.  By contrast, the relaxation of 
testamentary formalism involves replacing the rule of strict compliance, 
which has long required strict literal compliance with the prescribed for-
malities, with a more lenient formal compliance standard.237  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence suggests that all of these reforms, except for the elimina-
tion of the attestation requirement, would produce cumulative therapeutic 
results. 
Most importantly, however, a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis 
adds to the arguments in support of the relaxation of strict testamentary 
formalism.  The law reform movement has called for reform in this area 
for over thirty-five years with little success.238  However, therapeutic ju-
risprudence confirms the prudence of this reform and provides new mo-
mentum to the law reform movement that urges the adoption of a relaxed 
compliance standard.  All in all, therapeutic jurisprudence provides a 
new, insightful perspective of the role of testamentary formality in the 
estate planning process and ultimately suggests that therapeutic conse-
quences are relevant considerations for the reformers of the law of suc-
cession.  By considering these consequences, reformers can maximize 
the therapeutic potential of the law and maintain the therapeutic function 
of testamentary formality. 
 
                                                          
 235.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 236.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 237.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 238.  This law reform movement began with Professor John Langbein’s proposal, in 1975, for 
the adoption of the substantial compliance doctrine.  See generally Langbein, supra note 84.  Since 
that time only a handful of states have adopted the harmless error rule, which is the successor to 
Langbein’s substantial compliance doctrine.  See Waggoner, supra note 195, at 83. 
